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 Following the September 11 attacks and the war 
on terrorism, torture, as a form of interrogation, re-
entered public consciousness. When commenting on 
interrogational torture, one legal scholar, Alan 
Dershowitz, discussed its inevitability and how 
regulating its usage was superior to covertly practicing 
it. He arrived at this conclusion by comparing three 
values of democratic governments (and, presumably 
its citizens): (1) safety and security of a nation’s 
citizens; (2) preservation of civil liberties and human 
rights; and (3) accountability and visibility in a 
democracy. In times of conflict “the hard question is: 
which value is to be preferred when an inevitable clash 
occurs?”1 Preventing torture completely compromises 
(1), while practicing it clandestinely violates (3). 
Creating a “legal structure for limiting and controlling 
torture” compromises our “principled opposition to 
torture in all circumstances and create[s] a potentially 
dangerous and expendable situation,” or, in other 
words, it compromises value (3). 2 Because of torture’s  
                                                
1 Alan Dershowitz, “Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist be 
Tortured? A Case Study in How a Democracy Should Make 
Tragic Choices,” in Philosophy of Law, ed. Joel Feinberg and Jules 




inevitable nature, Dershowitz focuses on democratic 
nations either secretly practicing it or regulating it and 
then practicing it. By narrowing the options in this 
way, the debate is really over how important (3) is in a 
democratic society; Value (2) has already been 
dismissed as a point of concern in the interrogational 
torture dilemma. However, Dershowitz’s treatment of 
rights, as equal in weight to concerns such as 
democratic accountability and the safety and security 
of a nation’s citizens, debases and disregards the 
fundamental nature of rights. I want to argue that 
rights are prior to concerns such as (3) and (1) and thus 
should be weighted more heavily. If rights are prior in 
this manner, torture must not be a viable interrogation 
procedure. 
 In this paper, I want to explain how Dworkin’s 
theory of rights adequately characterizes the 
fundamental nature of rights and defeats utilitarian 
calculus arguments, which feature prominently in 
many ticking-time bomb scenario thought 
experiments, in favor of interrogational torture. 
Specifically, the right not to be tortured in 
interrogational procedures needs to be included as a 
concrete right derivable from Dworkin’s abstract right 
to equal concern and respect. In Section II, I begin with 
a brief discussion of torture and conclude that it is an 
asymmetrical relationship between the dominator and 
dominated that transforms the body of the dominated 
individual into a medium of suffering that functions 
completely against his/her will. This analysis is 
necessary in order to distinguish torture from ordinary 
punishment and reinforce its incompatibility with the  
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abstract right to equal concern and respect. In Section 
III, I explain Dworkin’s system of abstract and concrete 
rights. In Section IV, I show how a utilitarian ethic 
needs to include the right to equal concern and respect 
to avoid dangerous and undesirable consequences. I 
also explain how the ticking time bomb scenario, one 
of the lingering arguments for allowing interrogational 
torture, is defeated due to its classification as a 
utilitarian argument of policy. Finally, in Section V, I 
argue that the right not to be tortured ought to be 
included as a concrete right derived from Dworkin’s 
abstract right to equal concern and respect.  
 
II. Defining Torture 
 To define torture, I want to begin at the most 
rudimentary definition and add qualifiers until the 
definition is adequate in explaining how torture 
violates Dworkin’s right to equal concern and respect, 
which will be discussed in a later section. At a very 
basic level, Michael Davis defines torture as 
“fundamentally… [a] relation between sentient beings 
(torturer and tortured) in which the one makes the 
other suffer.”3 However, this conception of torture 
faces scope issues. How much suffering should count 
as torture? If one argues “suffering” broadly (any 
suffering counts as torture) then mere annoyance is 
torture. This is often how torture is used in more 
informal contexts. For example, I tell my friend 
someone has a crush on her and refuse to divulge his  
                                                
3 Michael Davis, “Torture and the Inhumane,” Criminal Justice 
Ethics 26 (2007): 31. 
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identity. After my incessant teasing, she might yell in 
agony, “Please stop torturing me like this!”   
 David Sussman provides a better rudimentary 
definition that resolves this scope issue. To him, 
torture “involves the deliberate infliction of great pain 
or some other intensely distressing affective state (fear, 
shame, disgust, and so forth) on an unwilling person 
for purposes that person does not and could not 
reasonably be expected to share.”4 Already, a 
profound lack of equal concern and respect is evident 
in the relationship between torturer and tortured, 
though the exact nature of this relationship is still 
unclear. Sussman and Davis both agree that an 
asymmetrical relationship exists between the torturer 
and the tortured, in that the latter is completely 
defenseless, while the former exercises complete 
power over the situation. Davis characterizes the 
torturer’s power as the ability to choose whom to 
torture, when to discontinue the torture, and the 
method of torture. The tortured, on the other hand, 
only decides on a course of action that could lead to 
him/her being tortured. Sussman conceives of the 
defenseless tortured person as being fully aware of her 
“inability to put up any real moral or legal resistance 
to her tormentor.”5 
 At this point, it may be said that torture closely 
resembles (legal) criminal punishment. Perhaps it is 
the legal nature of criminal punishment that serves as  
                                                
4 David Sussman, “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy and 




the distinguishing factor. However, this will not do. 
Many pre and post-modern countries practice 
legalized interrogational torture techniques. Soviet 
interrogators utilized forced standing against Axis 
POWs throughout World War II and continued to use 
the Stalinist Conveyor system, of which forced 
standing was a part, late into the 1950s. The British 
produced similar documentation on forced standing 
for its interrogators in 1956.6  
 Instead of legality serving as the distinguishing 
factor between criminal punishment and torture, a 
situation is judged to be torture based on a set of 
criteria. Sussman outlines torture as containing four 
essential features: (1) the pain is dispensed by another 
person; (2) it serves some purpose or point of another; 
(3) the victim lacks an escape mechanism (e.g. evasion, 
retaliation, protection against attacks); and (4) the pain 
serves to confuse and insult the victim's agency. 
7Darius Rejali qualifies (2) to include pain dispensed 
by “states or quasi-state officials and put towards 
public purposes” in a systematic, calculated manner.8  
The inclusion of (4) characterizes the experience the 
tortured’s body ceasing to be his own and instead 
being transformed into “a locus of suffering, as 
something that is aware of itself as a body available to 
and saturated by the active will of another.”9 In other  
                                                
6 Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 318-319. 
7 Sussman. 




words, the tortured loses all agency concerning his 
body since he can’t prevent the treatment he receives 
and even more egregious, he questions “his [own] 
ability to posses cares and commitments that are more 
immediately and authentically his own than those of 
another agent.”10 A torture victim’s autonomy is 
inverted –instead of having the choice to express 
feelings, desires and emotions – he expresses the 
torturer’s will through expressions of unbearable pain.  
 Criteria (4) is one of the distinguishing factors 
that separates torture from criminal punishment. 
Sussman writes that “the violence of war or police 
action may injure or insult an agent’s capacities for 
rational and moral self governance but such violence 
need not make the victim an accomplice in his own 
violation.”11 Criminals in jail do not experience their 
bodies as instrumental tools of suffering against 
themselves. Though they are encouraged to change 
their ways, they are not forced to suffer in order to 
ensure that goal. Another distinguishing factor 
between torture and criminal punishment is the 
uncertain duration and intensity of treatment 
experienced by the tortured. Jeremy Bentham writes 
that “the quantity of Punishment, be it ever so great is 
still determinate: it is determinate in intensity and 
duration [whereas] the quantity of Torture is 
indeterminate: it is determinate neither in intensity or  
 
 





duration.”12 Given this indeterminacy, Bentham argues 
that it is easy to torture an innocent unknowingly if it 
is used as an interrogational technique.13 
 So, our final broad definition for torture, based 
largely on David Sussman’s conception,  is an 
asymmetrical relationship between the dominator and 
dominated, which results in the dominator inducing 
great pain or suffering on the dominated against his 
will and not for his wellbeing. Specific instances of 
torture, such as water-boarding, that are used in order 
to obtain information raise other criterion that could be 
added to our definition such as a governmental agency 
or individual using a person purely for the means of 
obtaining information and using methods of intense 
pain in order to arrive at that goal. However, these 
specific instances still share the definition’s overall 
structure. The critical difference between criminal 
punishment in general and torture is the loss and 
inversion of autonomy suffered by torture victim 
 
 
III. Dworkin’s Division of Rights 
Dworkin also distinguishes abstract rights from 
concrete rights.14 An abstract right is “a general  
                                                
12 Jeremy Bentham, “Of Torture,” in The Phenomenon of Torture, 
ed. William F. Schultz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2007), 223. 
13 Ibid. 
14 In this paper, I am avoiding the exceedingly difficult issue of 
conflicts between abstract rights and concrete rights and between 
two concrete rights. Diana Meyers’ addresses the first issue in her 
article entitled “Rights-based Rights.” She discusses a situation 
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political aim the statement of which does not indicate 
how that general aim is to be weighted or 
compromised in particular circumstances against other 
political aims.”15 Conversely, concrete rights are 
“political aims that are more precisely defined so as to 
express more definitely the weight they have against 
other political aims on particular occasions.”16 The 
difference between the two types of rights lies in their 
applicability and whether they are enforced or not. 
Abstract rights function as foundational rights that 
apply generally “with no suggestions that these rights 
are absolute [nor any] attempt to suggest [an] impact 
on particular complex social situations.”17 They remain 
un-individuated without reference to social situations 
and serve to provide a general foundation for more 
specific applications.18 For example, many rights are 
based on right to equality which functions as an 
abstract right. Concrete rights are derived from 
abstract rights and are meant to be applied in specified 
situations. For instance, a newspaper specifically has a 
right to publish potentially damaging information 
about a person provided that it is true (freedom of the  
 
                                                
where the abstract right to equal concern and respect would 
suspend the concrete right to freedom of the person. For more, see 
Diana T. Meyers, “Rights-based Rights,” Philosophy and Law  3 
(1984): 175-191.  
15 Dworkin, 93. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 It is helpful to think about Rawls’ three principles of justice as 
examples of this type of abstract right. 
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press). The claim of concrete rights is “more definitive 
than any claim of abstract right that supports it.”19  
Both abstract rights and concrete rights can 
generate the type of claim-rights and liberty-rights 
discussed in the previous sections. However, abstract 
rights are rights that provide support for concrete 
rights (which can function as either negative or 
positive claim-rights) and are generally broad. 
However, my focus here is on concrete rights as rights 
in the strong sense where “some special grounds are 
needed for justifying any interference.”20 Thus, when I 
assert a negative concrete claim-right to publish a 
newspaper article with potentially damaging, but true, 
information this imposes a duty on others (especially 
the government) to not interfere without justification. 
This situational right is based on an abstract right to 
free speech. If I use my abstract liberty right to bear 
arms, this could generate a liberty right to purchase 
guns in a rural American town. However, concerns of 
this type are not my paper’s focus, but it does deserve 
to be mentioned that abstract rights could be used in 
this way. 
One important abstract right that is incredibly 
important is the right to equal concern and respect 
which requires that certain “individual [concrete] 
rights to distinct liberties”21 to be respected. Some 
examples of these latter rights are those guaranteed by 
the Constitution. The right to equal concern and  
                                                
19 Ibid. 




respect is defined as treating human beings as 
“capable of suffering and…forming and acting on 
intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be 
lived.”22 This abstract right to equal concern and 
respect generates certain concrete claim rights (both 
negative and positive). However, equal concern and 
respect can be interpreted in two different ways: the 
right to treatment as an equal or the right to equal 
treatment. The right to equal treatment is the “right to 
an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource 
or burden.”23 Conversely, the right to treatment as an 
equal is the right “to be treated with the same respect 
and concern as anyone else.”24 The profound 
difference between these two rights is that one deals 
with distributional equality of goods for individuals, 
while the other deals with equal respect of individuals. 
Equal respect of individuals is prior and does not 
always entail equal treatment of individuals. Other 
circumstances could affect the situation. For example, I 
can still respect my friend and not give him an equal 
slice of the pizza we ordered. I can give him one-
quarter of the pizza, while giving myself three-
quarters and still respect him because I know he ate 
before arriving at my house. This example further 
supports the claim that our focus should not be on 
equal distribution. However, I am not respecting my 
friend if I deny him pizza knowing that he is sitting 
hungry and proceed to consume the entire pizza in  
                                                
22 Dworkin, 272. 




front of him. In the first case, I am still respecting my 
friend but not giving him an equal distribution of 
goods while the second case shows that by not equally 
distributing goods, I could profoundly disrespect my 
friend. 
To review, I have hitherto discussed the 
distinctions between liberty and claim rights and 
abstract and concrete rights. Claim-rights impose 
correlative duties on others, whereas liberty rights 
function as permission to refrain or perform certain 
actions. Abstract rights are foundational rights that 
function as principles to provide support for concrete 
rights, which are attached to determinate situations. 
The intersection between these different categories 
occurs when Dworkin’s abstract right to equal concern 
and respect generates certain concrete negative (or 
positive) claim-rights. In the next section, I will discuss 
how these individual, concrete rights serve as trumps 
over utilitarian arguments of policy. 
 
IV. Dworkin’s System of Rights as Trumps over 
Utilitarian Concerns including the Ticking-Time 
Bomb Scenario 
Dworkin states that individual concrete rights 
derived from the abstract right to equal concern and 
respect serve as trumps over utilitarian arguments of 
policy. Utilitarian arguments of policy proclaim that 
“the community as a whole will be better off because 
more of its citizens will have more of what they want 
overall, even though some of them will have less.”25  
                                                
25 Dworkin, 274. 
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Dworkin argues that, prima facie, these types of 
arguments appear to confirm the fundamental right of 
equal concern and respect, but upon further 
investigation, they violate it. This argument is worth 
investigating as the most potent argument for torture – 
the ticking time-bomb thought experiment—is based 
on utilitarian premises. 
To a utilitarian, people are treated as equals 
when “the preferences of each, weighted only for 
intensity are balanced in the same scales, with no 
distinction for persons or merit.” In other words, 
equality is achieved when no preferences are 
discounted based on their content. Thus, personal 
(how you wish your life to go, your goals) and external 
(how you wish others lives to go and what you think 
their goals should be) preferences are included in the 
utilitarian calculus. Dworkin argues that many 
external preferences are “corrupted.” so in order for 
utilitarianism to correct for this, it needs to disentangle 
personal from external preferences and only count 
personal preferences. However, these two beliefs are 
inextricably linked making disentanglement a useless 
endeavor.  The right to equal concern and respect and 
other derivable rights are seen as a corrective force by 
checking the power of external preferences on the 
utilitarian calculus. “Rights are to prevail over utility 
precisely because the whole point of setting them up is 
to correct for the defects in the utilitarian arguments 
which are likely to oppose them.”26 
                                                




 Consider a community of homophobic persons, 
who each argue that homosexuals’ preferences should 
only count for half, while their own preferences should 
count for 2 (with 1 being the weight everyone’s 
preferences are supposed to be given). If enough 
people believed this, then homosexuals would be 
denied equal concern and respect not “on the 
competition among personal preferences that abstract 
statements of utilitarianism suggest,”27 but because of 
the addition of an external preference (of homophobia) 
to a personal preference. External preferences are a 
person's views on how others should live their lives. 
Their lives are deemed less important than a 
heterosexual and their preferences, as the minority, 
would only count for half.  
 If I want to argue that the right not to be 
tortured should be included because it is a violation of 
the abstract right to equal concern and respect, I must 
address the relevancy of ticking-time bomb scenario 
type arguments. If they function as utilitarian 
arguments of policy (which I believe they do), then 
they are immediately disqualified from consideration 
in trumping rights. However, this type of argument 
must be explained fully in order to understand both its 
relation to utilitarianism and why it is so important to 
undermine it.  
 William F. Schultz explains that “far more than 
one philosopher, scholar or lawyer has argued the case 
for torture in the context of interrogation” and that the 
most “popular and persistent form of the debate  
                                                
27 Dworkin, 275. 
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focuses on the so-called ‘ticking time bomb 
scenario.’”28 These scenarios contain two main 
premises: (1) there is going to be some event that will 
occur within a short amount of time which kills 
hundreds of people; (2) the police have in custody a 
person who, if tortured, will divulge information 
necessary to prevent the event from occurring.29 In 
these cases, if the person is tortured, the greater 
community would be better off. Though this appears 
to be an obvious point, the external preferences of 
those affected (i.e. those who would be killed by the 
event) argue that the terrorist/fanatic should be 
tortured are balanced against the one 
terrorist/fanatic’s personal preference to not be 
tortured. This argument is designed to maximize 
“general utility” which is calculated to “produce more  
                                                
28 William F. Schultz, introduction to Chapter VI in The 
Phenomenon of Torture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2007), 219. 
29 Numerous philosophers have constructed fanciful ticking time-
bomb scenarios. Michael Levin , one of the few scholars to publish 
an essay on torture in a main-stream news media source 
(Newsweek), imagines a terrorist who hid an atomic bomb on 
Manhattan Island. The authorities capture him two hours before 
the bomb is set to detonate and Levin asks whether we would 
torture the terrorist. See Levin, Michael, “The Case for Torture,” 
in The Phenomenon of Torture, ed. William F. Schultz (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 2007), 227-229. Henry Shue conceives 
of a similar situation except that it involves a fanatic hiding a 
nuclear bomb  set to explode in the heart of Paris. For more on 
Shue’s construction and his argument against torture from self 
defense, see Henry Shue, “Torture,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 
(1978): 124-143.  
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over-all benefit than harm. In a previous section, I 
discussed why this type of thinking is problematic. 
Thus far, we have discussed the character of 
rights in Dworkin’s system and one unacceptable 
justification for infringing rights that is used in favor of 
torture in limited circumstances. What about those 
cases involving massive disasters? Dworkin disregards 
this as a probable justification. “…This argument 
ignores the primitive distinction between what may 
happen and what will happen…We must…discount 
the gravity of the evil threatened by the likelihood of 
reaching that evil.”30 The speculative claim of massive 
disaster is never certain, so it is not an acceptable 
justification for infringing rights. However, certain 
writers have misunderstood Dworkin’s position on 
this matter. For example, Mirko Bagaric and Julie 
Clarke describe Dworkin’s position as allowing rights 
infringement in the case of massive disasters.31 The 
passage they quote is not an instance where Dworkin 
asserts this claim, but is instead one that simply states 





                                                
30 Dworkin, 195. 
31 They write that “Dworkin accepts that it is correct for a 
government to infringe on a right when it is necessary to protect a 
more important right or to ward off ‘some grave threat to society,’” 
(my emphasis). Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clark, Torture (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2007), 23-24. 
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V. Torture as a Violation of Dworkin’s Fundamental 
Abstract Right 
 To review, Dworkin argues that the 
fundamental abstract right of equal concern and 
respect generates certain negative claim-rights. By 
negative claim-rights, he means strong negative duties 
of non-interference or non-participation in activities 
against a determinate individual or institution despite 
even the strongest moral considerations. In this section 
I want to argue that torture violates the fundamental 
claim-right of equal concern and respect. As such, the 
right not to be tortured should be included as one of 
Dworkin’s derivable negative claim-rights.  
 Dworkin defines equal concern and respect 
within a government-citizen context, but this 
relationship could be broadened to include non-
citizens. “Government must treat those whom it 
governs with concern, that is, as human beings who 
are capable of suffering and frustration, and with 
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of 
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how 
their lives should be lived.”32 Both concern and respect 
as defined by Dworkin are absent in torture contexts. 
 The dissolution of concern for torture victims 
begins when torturers are trained. Jessica Wolfendale 
describes how elite military units use survival training 








own suffering then to the suffering of others.33 This 
desensitization is achieved by resistance training 
laboratories, where trainees “undergo a highly realistic 
re-creating of the experience of being captured and 
interrogated by the enemy.”34 Examples of these re-
creation sequences include prolonged forced standing, 
unbearable noise and blindfolding. In 1968, one Green 
Beret described how he had been taught to ‘put a 
bucket on people’s heads and bang on it.’35 After they 
participate in the tortured role, the trainees play the 
torturer which teaches them to “be desensitized to the 
infliction of pain.”36 
 The discourse of professionalism also aids 
trained torturers in disambiguating the violence they 
propagate from its human receiver. Torturers envision 
themselves as professionals performing the 
unpleasant, but necessary, duties to protect their 
nation from external threats.37 Thus, torturers measure 
their success by how well they torture without 
considering the possible reasons for resorting to 
torture or the possible impact it has on their victims.38 
Interrogators, like Sgt. Mark Hadsell, stationed at a 
camp near Abu Ghraib praised the “special  
                                                
33 Jessica Wolfendale, “Training Torturers: A Critique of the 
“Ticking Bomb” Argument,” Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006): 
275. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Rejalli, 362. 
36 Wolfendale, 277. 
37 Wolfendale, 278. 
38 Wolfendale, 280. 
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interrogational techniques [interrogators used] such as 
sleep deprivation or loud music. They can’t take it. 
Trust me it works,” they said.39 
  Respect for other human beings is also lost in 
torture situations. This disrespect begins with the 
profoundly unequal relationship propagated in torture 
contexts. The dominator controls the situation 
completely with little concern for the dominated’s 
welfare. One only needs to look at pictures from Abu 
Ghraib to recognize this inequality. Two smiling U.S. 
military personnel stand behind a pyramid of naked 
Iraqis. One soldier holds a leash attached to an 
incapacitated, naked Iraqi lying helplessly on the floor. 
This treatment is contrary to any vision of life formed 
by a human being and violates a cornerstone of 
Dworkin’s conception of respect. 
 In addition, this prolonged treatment affects 
further life aspirations. The personalities of many 
torture victims are drastically altered by their 
experience. Instead of the extroverted and active 
personality they once had, victims isolate themselves 
and avoid contact with other people. This avoidance of 
contact is due to the loss of confidence in other people. 
They also experience anxiety, sleep disturbances and 
nightmares and many activities, such as going to the 
doctor and speaking with authorities, become difficult  
due to their association to torture (e.g. the sight of 
medical equipment, personnel in uniforms, etc.).40   
                                                
39 Rejali, 509. 
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 To review, through the desensitization of pain 
and discourse of professionalism surrounding torture, 
torturers are trained to maximize, instead of avoid, the 
suffering and frustrations of their victims, which 
violates Dworkin’s right to equal concern. Torture is 
also not associated with any human being’s conception 
of their life and profoundly affects any future life 
prospects for the worse, thus violating Dworkin’s right 
to equal respect. Given these violations of the abstract 
right to equal concern and respect, governments need 
to be prohibited from using torture as an 
interrogational method. So, the right not to be tortured 
in interrogational procedures should be included as a 
concrete negative claim-right derivable from this 





 In this paper, I have argued that if Dworkin’s 
abstract right to equal concern and respect generates 
certain concrete negative claim-rights, then the right 
not to be tortured should be included as one of these 
generated rights. I explained how rights were 
necessary in defeating appeals to utilitarianism which 
could result in undesirable circumstances. I then 
argued that the ticking-time bomb scenario should be  
 
                                                
40 Lone Jacobson and Edith Montgomery, “Treatment of Victims 
of Torture,” in The Phenomenon of Torture, ed. William F. Schultz 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 285-286. 
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dismissed as justification for allowing torture given its 
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